SYNPOSIS. The analysis of risk-sensitive foraging is beginning to explore the psychological and cognitive mechanisms involved in decision-making under uncertainty as well as the more traditional functional analysis. Over the past 40 years cognitive psychologists exploring human decision-making have made great use of apparent "paradoxes" in rational choice behavior in elucidating aspects of information-processing. In this paper I review several of these paradoxes as they might relate to animal decisionmaking and the interpretation of cognitive architecture. The St. Petersburg Paradox can be related directly to the original analysis of risk-sensitive foraging by focusing on the non-linear translation of resources into currencies of evolutionary value, e.g., rate of energy gain. The Allais Paradox focuses on the need to evaluate the organism's perception of probabilities and possible non-linearities in the assignment of likelihood. Various context-effects illustrate the potential difficulties associated with decisionmaking over options with multiple attributes. Where possible I illustrate the biological evaluation of the paradoxes discussed.
INTRODUCTION
All animals are faced with the arduous task of making complex decisions within specific ecological contexts in their inevitable struggle for the acquisition of critical resources and mates. A major problem for behavioral biologists is to understand how information from the environment is processed in fulfilling the requirements for survival and reproduction, and how the organization and biases within brain or cognitive architecture may limit or facilitate appropriate information processing patterns.
The use of "Paradox" has been a particularly powerful tool in analyzing the cognitive structure of human decision-making and will undoubtedly prove an invaluable tool in the analysis of non-human behavior as well. My intent in this article is to review some of the most frequently explored forms of paradox in human decision-making and suggest ways in which such paradoxes may (or have) been used in analyzing non-hu-man decision-making. This review should complement traditional approaches in foraging theory by suggesting useful methods for exploring cognitive aspects of information-processing. The complementarity of traditional foraging theory and the use of paradox is quite direct. In fact, risk-sensitive foraging has its very roots in a classical paradox in behavior. But what does it mean for an animal or a human to behave paradoxically?
Paradox as I am using it here can only be understood within the context of a certain model of rationality. A rational theory of decision-making consists of a model (usually some rule or set of rules) of behavior for which there is a reasonable argument for the validity of the model that when followed produces a consistent pattern of choices over alternatives. The argument could be based on observation or on some criterion of logic. Rationality is, consequently, model dependent and defined by the existence of a set of rules that produces consistent patterns of choice over alternatives. So, for example, rational choice in economics demands transitivity in choice behavior, i.e., the condition where if option A is preferred to option B, and option B is preferred to option C, then option A will be preferred to option C. Otherwise, patterns of choice would be inconsistent and, therefore, considered irrational. The major objective in contemporary economic theory is to discern an appropriate set of rules that when applied to choices generate consistency, i.e., find the rule of choice between A and B and B and C such that it produces transitivity.
A paradox arises when organisms fail to follow the rules that we believe ought to govern their pattern of choices. These departures from expectation can provide essential clues into how information is processed in the brain and how models must be modified to account for the apparent paradox. Here is a very simple example, often used as a classic illustration of irrationality in choice behavior. You are presented with two envelopes. In each envelope is written a number. A rational argument would consider the probability that the number in the second envelope is higher than the number in the already opened first envelope. Our intuition is that the higher the number we know in the first envelope the lower the probability must be that the number in the second envelope will be greater than the first. But actually, since all numbers are possible and since numbers are infinite, the probability that the number in the second envelope is higher than the number in the first is always greater no matter what number is discovered in the first envelope. There is always an infinite number of numbers higher than whatever is discovered; therefore, the only rational behavior is to always take the second envelope. However, most people do not consistently switch to the second envelope, rather their switching depends upon their experience.
One simple explanation for this paradox is that people do not perceive numbers as infinite. Nothing in our everyday experience helps us in this task since the infinity of numbers is an abstract concept outside experience. In fact, our everyday experience lends considerable support to the notion that really big numbers are exceedingly rare. We see in our lives a lot more one dollar bills than $500 bills or $5000 dollar bills, etc. Within the context of our actual experience, the observed behavior does not seem paradoxical at all. As I will indicate, often the resolution of apparent paradoxical behavior rests on determining the difference between the actual experience of the organism and our abstract concept of the organism's experiences.
THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX AND RISK-SENSITIVE FORAGING
One of the oldest paradoxes in human economic behavior originates in a simple game, the St. Petersburg Paradox. The problem is as follows. I toss a fair coin repeatedly until it comes up tails. If it comes up tails on the first toss, you get $1. If it takes two tosses before a tails appears, then you get $2. If it takes three tosses, you get $4. If it takes t tosses, then you get 2'~' dollars as a payoff. What do you expect to win in such a game? The expected payoff is the amount of the payoff weighted by the likelihood that you will get that payoff or
I -=oc. (i)
Since the game has an infinite expected value then you should be willing to pay anything to play this game. But how much are you willing to pay? Here in lies the paradox. Most people are not willing to pay very much for the privilege of playing this game. Why not?
The solution to this paradox, or at least one solution, was first proposed by Bernoulli in 1738 in a brilliant seminal paper laying the foundation for modern decision theory. In the paper Bernoulli noted that what matters to the gambler is not the actual amount of money won but the subjective value of the money, which he called the "utility" of the money. Bernoulli proposed that the utility of money shows diminishing returns as a function of the actual amount of money; in fact he proposed a specific utility function (the logarithm). When we calculate the Bernoulli expected utility of the St. Petersburg Paradox the game has a finite solution, i.e.,
When calculated in this manner, the gambler should be willing to play the game for any amount under $1.98. In the same year, Cramer suggested an alternative function (the square root of money) as the appropriate valuation function in the St. Petersburg Paradox and one arrives at a finite solution through the use of this function as well. The important point realized by both Bernoulli and Cramer was that the Paradox could be resolved by introducing some form of nonlinear valuation function into the gamble.
The St. Petersburg Paradox and Bernoulli's solution to the problem are central to explanations of risk-sensitive foraging behavior. Every theory or account of risk-sensitive foraging behavior incorporates some form of non-linear translation of resources into some measure of evolutionary value. In many cases the translation involves proximate measures, such as amount of food into energetic value. In other cases, the translation involves a more ultimate measure, such as energetic rate into offspring production or survival. The critical aspect of any of these models, however, remains the non-linearity first eluded to by Bernoulli.
Since I am most familiar with bumble bees let me illustrate this point using these bees as a model system. I will only go over this example briefly since I have discussed this point before (Real 1991 (Real , 1992 . It is now quite clear that bumble bees under normal conditions in the hive (i.e., growing colonies with amble supplies of honey stored such that they are in positive energy balance) will prefer constantly rewarding over variably rewarding flowers of comparable expectation, i.e., the bees under positive energy balance are risk-averse. If blue flowers contain 2 u,l per flower and yellow contain 6 u.1 in only a third of the flowers, then the bees will prefer the blue to the yellow flowers. This pattern of choice behavior has been documented in a large number of experiments (Real 1981; Real et al., 1982; Waddington et al, 1981; Cartar and Dill, 1990) . The link between risk aversion in the bumble bees and Bernoulli's solution to risk aversion in humans (and hence the St. Petersburg Paradox) is the articulation of an underlying non-linearity in the bumble bee's translation of nectar reward size into rate of net energy gain (i.e., the bee's "utility" of reward). Harder and Real (1987) snowed that the rate of net energy gain to the individual bee shows diminishing returns with increasing nectar reward size according to
where e is the energy content of 1 mg of sucrose (15.48 J); p is the nectar density (mg/u,l); 5 is the nectar concentration (% sucrose equivalents); Vis the nectar volume (|xl); W is the bee's mass (g); 7} is flight time between flowers (sec); K p and K f are energetic costs of probing and flying (J/g/sec); T a is time required for entering and leaving a flower (sec); and / is the ingestion rate (|xl/sec).
Equation ( FIG. 1. Non-linear relationship between reward size (|xl) and net rate of energetic gain for an individual bumble bee typically used in artificial floral choice experiments. The relationship was derived from biomechanical properties of the bee's time and energy demands associated with nectar extraction (adapted from Harder and Real, 1987) . Such a non-linear relationship accounts for the higher expected rate of net energy gain from constant over variably rewarding flowers.
bees seem to maximize the expected utility, that is, the expected net rate of energetic gain, in a manner consistent with the simple Bernoulli theory. It would be easy at this point to suggest that the bees are simply expected rate maximizers rather than risksensitive foragers. On the other hand, risk has historically meant any behavioral decisions influenced by the family of distribution parameters associated with commodities or outcomes (e.g., see Arrow's, 1970 , classic discussion of risk-taking behavior and decision-making). The bees' choices are influenced by the variance in reward size and therefore, they fit the definition of risk used by most decision theorists. That individual bees appear to maximize the expected value of this nonlinear function reveals aspects of cognitive information processing. The information used in calculating the average rate of energy gain from foraging has two dimensions. The first dimension characterizes the number of flower visits over which the average is determined, i.e., over the last 5, 10, or 40 flowers, for example. I suggest we call this number the "memory string." The second dimension characterizes the number of flowers over which the rate is calculated, i.e., the rate from one flower, two, or more.
I suggest we call this number the "frame size." The two dimensions are independent: the bee could maintain a very long string in memory of individual flower rates or the bee could pool all of the information across flowers but only maintain a short string in memory. As has been indicated by Possingham et al. (1990) , expected value maximization of equation (3) implies the use of short-term averaging over rates of energetic gain over individual flowers (i.e., frame sizes of one flower) rather than the more traditional long-term averaging algorithms where energetic rates are calculated over pooled sets of flowers (i.e., frame size is equal to the number of total flower visits assumed very large). In Real et al. (1990) we argued that the use of short-term averaging (i.e., using small frame sizes) may be adaptive given a variety of neural constraints or environmental patterns of temporal and/or spatial autocorrelation (see also Real 1991 Real , 1992 . In all of these arguments there is some advantage associated with maintaining both short-strings of information or experience in the forger's memory and calculating expected rate of net energy gain based on the energetic quality of individual flowers (i.e., small frame size). For example, if the floral environment shows high degrees of spatial autocorrelation, then averaging over large sample sizes of pooled rewards over many individual flowers will tend to loose the rapidly changing structure of the environment. Averages over short-strings based on individual flowers will prove the best predictor of the immediate future encountered by the forager. Consequently, one should be able to figure out the optimal combination of frame size and string length based upon the spatial and temporal structure of the environment.
During summer 1995, Elizabeth Marschall and I examined the two-dimensional spatial organization of standing nectar crops in a common bumble bee pollinated woody creeper, Vaccinium erythrocarpum, the mountain cranberry. This species is ideal for accessing spatial pattern and bee foraging since the plant spreads horizontally eliminating three dimensional structure and is also the most commonly visited species when in flower. We sampled all open flow-ers over a 10 X 14 m grid subdivided into 5 X 5 cm subquadrats generating over 37,000 contiguous cells. Using spatial autocorrelation statistics, we estimate high levels of spatial autocorrelation on extremely small spatial scales, i.e., on the order of centimeters (Real and Marschall, unpublished data) . We are now in the process of evaluating the performance of different cognitive architectures by constructing simulations of bee foraging over these empirically determined floral landscapes where individual bees differ in the cognitive rules {e.g., frame size and string length) they use in guiding foraging behavior.
An interesting independent examination of the bumble bee's cognitive architecture was undertaken by Read Montague and his colleagues using artificial neural network simulations, an approach that should prove a valuable direction for future research in animal decision-making (Montague et ai, 1995) . The neural network model of the bee's choice behavior is based on new findings on the neural basis for learning in the honey bee.
In a series of elegant recent papers, Hammer (1993; Hammer and Menzel, 1995) identified a specific neuron, VUMmxl, in the honeybee suboesophogeal ganglion that delivers information about reward in classical conditioning experiments. In many traditional learning experiments using honeybees, individual bees can learn to associate reward (sugar water) with specific odorants. Conditioning occurs when sugar water, placed directly on the bee's antennae, is paired with a puff of specific odor. Antennal stimulation by reward results in reflexive extension of the bee's proboscis and following conditioning, presentation of odor in the absence of rewarding stimuli results in the same proboscis extension (e.g., Menzel, 1990) . Hammer discovered that direct stimulation of the VUMmxl neuron can substitute for antennal stimulation using sugar rewards and that VUMmxl stimulation can be paired with odors leading to the same conditioned response as reward learning. Hammer's results indicate the neural substrate involved in associative learning of rewards in the bee. Hammer and Menzel (1995) the VUMmxl can be replaced by direct delivery of octopamine (the presumed neural transmitter) to the bee's brain regions corresponding to the antennal lobes and mushroom bodies. Montague et al. (1995) constructed a simple neural network based on VUMmxl that captures the essential features of floral choice under uncertainty and that mimics the results of our choice experiments using bumble bee's foraging on artificial fields of floral color types differing in reward distribution. In their simulation, the individual forager moves around in a three dimensional arena. On the floor of the arena is a field of yellow and blue squares (160 X 160) representing flowers of two types. From a given location in the arena, the bee can see a portion of the field determined by a cone of vision that changes as the bee moves about the arena. The architecture of their neural network is outlined in Figure 2 where P is a simple linear neural unit that corresponds to VUMmxl. This unit pairs the reward stimulus r(t) with color inputs and the output from P modifies motor behavior toward flowers of a given type or random tumbling into a new field of vision. The association between color inputs and reward stimulus follows a Hebbian learning rule which in their simulation becomes equivalent to the Rescorla-Wagner rule for classical conditioning Bitterman, 1987, 1988; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) . The learning rate is characterized by a parameter X. with 0 < k < 1 such that when X is high the bee learns very quickly and alters behavior according to immediate short-term experiences. A low value for A. corresponds to a lack of short-term response but maintains the capability of responding over long-term average changes in the environment.
The link between Bernoulli's St. Petersburg Paradox, our earlier experiments describing a utility function for the individual bumble bee, and the Montague neural network is established through the specific shape of the reward stimulus r(t) as a function of nectar volume in encountered flowers in the arena. Rewards are scaled in value in the neural network according to the derived biomechanical utility function (equation 3) and Montague et al. use this utility model as the output from the reward neuron R.
Montague et al. modeled bumble bee foraging in the artificial arena where the simulated floral field followed the nectar distributions in yellow and blue flowers that I used in my original 1981 experiments, i.e., blue flowers contained 2 fil in each flower, while yellow contained 6 u.1 in a third of the flowers and 0 |xl in the remaining twothirds. The computer simulation produced a remarkably good fit to the observed pattern of choice by bees (Fig. 3) , but only when the learning rate \ in the neural network was high (\ = 0.9). Thus, the neural network matched bee performance when the architecture of the learning rule corresponded to extreme short-term responsiveness. These neural network simulations based on very plausible neural mechanisms further support the general claim that bees use only short-term immediate experiences in shaping their foraging decisions.
This combination of experiments, analyt- ic models, and simulations lays the foundation for the neurobiological, biomechanical, psychological and evolutionary mechanisms involved in the bee's decision-making. All of these treatments and explorations are tied, however, to resolving apparent paradoxical behavior of the sort characterized by the St. Petersburg Paradox. Bernoulli's resolution of the paradox through the introduction of expected utility theory has proven a invaluable tool in articulating animal choice behavior. By focusing on the basic nonlinear relationships underlying the translation of resources into currencies of evolutionary value we can explore a variety of mechanisms underlying animal behavior at different levels of organization from the neuronal to the ecological. The resolution of the St. Petersburg Paradox and the above discussion of bees focuses on only one aspect of decision-making; that is, how organisms assign value to resources or outcomes. Every decision problem, however, is determined both by value assignment and probability assignment. A very valuable outcome may not be chosen if it is perceived as very unlikely to occur. Consequently, any theory of choice must examine the perception of probability as well as the perception of value. The second most important paradox in decision at Pennsylvania State University on February 20, 2013 http://icb.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from theory, the "Allais Paradox," has been used to articulate some of the interesting nonlinearity that may be associated with probability perception.
THE ALLAIS PARADOX AND PROBABILITY PERCEPTION
One of the earliest and best known examples of violations of linearity in probability perception is the Allais Paradox first explored by Maurice Allais, the distinguished French economist and Nobel laureate (Allais 1953 ). Allais presented human subjects with simple choices like the following:
Option A: Lottery ticket #1 gives $30 with probability equal to 1.0
Lottery ticket #2 gives $40 with probability equal to 0.8
Option B: Lottery ticket #1 gives $30 with probability equal to 0.25
Lottery ticket #2 gives $40 with probability equal to 0.20
Within each option, the problem is to choose which lottery ticket to purchase, say for $1. In most cases, in Option A people prefer lottery ticket #1 over lottery ticket #2. However, in Option B, they prefer lottery #2 to lottery #1. This pattern of choice behavior is clearly irrational if the subjects maintain linear probability perceptions since the relative likelihood of the payoffs, i.e., 1.0/0.8 and 0.25/0.20, are identical across Options A and B. If one prefers lottery ticket #1 in Option A, then it is only rational to prefer lottery ticket #1 in Option B. But many people do not behave rationally under this decision problem, and one common explanation is that humans do not perceive probabilities linearly (see Edwards, 1992 , for a survey of utility theories incorporating non-linear probability perception as a key component). There is some empirical evidence that animals may not perceive probabilities linearly and may commit the Allais Paradox under some test conditions (Battalio et ai, 1985; Kagel et ai, 1990) . There are a variety of test procedures that can be used to elicit probability assignments from organisms. One procedure for assessing subjective probability assumes individuals follow an expected utility model for choice (Real, 1987) . Let a flower type be represented by two rewards states JC, and x 2 with objective probabilities p x andp 2 = (1 -p{). LetUQt,, x 2 ) represent the utility from using flower type X. Then the expected utility is given by EU(JC,, x 2 ) = P.U0C,) + (1 The rate of substitution of x, for x 2 along a curve generating equal expected utility, i.e., a "utility indifference curve," is given by dx 2
Pi
-p x )\J\x 2 ) This represents the conditional substitution of reward states with fixed probabilities that generate the same benefit to the bee.
A plot of this indifference curve in the (*,, x 2 ) coordinate system gives a curve which is concave-from-the-origin and downwardly sloping if U(AT,, X 2 ) shows diminishing returns. At the 45° line x, = x 2 , so U'(x,)/U'(x 2 ) = 1. Therefore, at the 45°l ine dx 2 /dx, = -p,/(l -/?,). We use this condition to operationally derive subjective probability. Experimentally, we have manipulated the alternative reward states until establishing the indifference curve and then measured the slope of that curve at the 45°p oint.
Using an enclosed colony of bumble bees (Bombus bimaculatus) I have constructed such an indifference curve (Real, 1991) . The results indicate a strong subjective component to the individual bee's assessment of reward probability. I constrained bees to foraging on an artificial patch of 200 artificial white and blue flowers of equal abundance. White flowers always contained 4 (xl of nectar, while blue flowers had two possible reward states occurring with fixed probabilities of prob(x,) = 0.8 and prob(jc 2 ) = 0.2. Indifference was determined by adjusting the two reward states in blue flowers until bees foraged equally from the constant white and the variable blue flowers. A regression analysis generates the best fit through reward states that correspond to indifferent foraging. If the bees followed the objective probabilities, then the slope of the regression through the indifference points would equal -.8/.2 = -4 . Instead, the slope equals -8.25. A slope of this value indicates that prob (JC,) = 0.89 and probO 2 ) = 0.11. Thus, subjective probabilities are biased in such a manner that overestimates common events and underestimates rare events (Real, 1991) .
To increase the sensitivity of the regression analysis one can use the magnitude of preference measured as percentage visits to a particular flower rather than simply the ordinal direction of preference. By using magnitude of preference we can construct response surfaces rather than regression lines. The contours of the response surface reveal more of the detail of choice behavior since all reward state combinations can be incorporated into the analysis. When analyzed using magnitude of preference, the data used in the earlier report show significant non-linearity in the surface contours. Analysis of individual worker performance (rather than pooled responses) indicates similar non-linear transformations in subjective probability with common events over-represented (Real, unpublished data) . Battalio et al. (1985) and Kagel et al. (1990) directly tested for the Allais paradox by subjecting laboratory rats to choices among rewarding lotteries with an Allais structure. They found some evidence that rats commit Allais-type violation of rational choice behavior. Recently, Ralph Carter and I performed experiments using enclosed bumble bee colonies to see if individual foragers commit Allais-type violations of chocie behavior or whether energetic currency was sufficient to account for patterns of floral preference. We exploited the following design.
The Allais Paradox can be presented in the following general form: Choice 1: A: reward X 2 with probability p reward X 3 with probability 1 -p B: reward X, with probability q reward X 3 with probability 1 -q Choice 2: C: reward X 2 with probability rp reward X 3 with probability 1 -rp D: reward X, with probability rq reward X 3 with probability 1 -rq where p > q, 0 < X, < X 2 < X 3 , and 0 < r < 1. The parameter r corresponds to a linear transformation of the probabilities that maintains the relative likelihood. This form is known as the "Common Ratio" form of the Allais paradox since rp/rq = p/q. In our experiments we used different reward sizes (Xj) and probabilities in accordance with the structure above. In eighteen bees tested individually over choices 1 and 2, only one bee exhibited the Allais paradox. Rather, the individual bee's choices appear to be governed entirely by energetic considerations. In two independent series, we generated flowers that either differed in short-term energetic reward or long-term energetic gain. In every case, individual bees consistently choose that floral type generating the greatest short-term energetic gain over floral types that generated greater long-term gain. These experiments once again confirm that bumble bees use of short-term rates as the currency of choice, and indicate that choice in these experiments does not involve non-linear probability assignments. Probabilities appear to be transformed linearly into short-term averages.
It seems obvious from these few experiments that probability perception and irrational choice patterns depend upon the specific experimental tests. In some cases, probabilities seem to be non-linearly perceived in other cases, they appear to be perceived linearly. Whether these differences are artifacts of the test conditions or whether they are due to more complex, and possibly adaptive, information-processing schemes remains an open question. Much more research should be directed at how organisms perceive likelihood of occurrence and how likelihood can be related to more fundamental experiences such as the temporal pattern of experience in relation to memory processes. FIG. 4 . Optical illusion demonstrating a simple context effect. The center circles in both the top and bottom ring are the same size. However, when surrounded by smaller circles, the inner circle appears larger. Size in this illustration is computed on a relative scale rather than an absolute scale.
CONTEXT EFFECTS AND MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES
Models of rational choice and most foraging theories assume that there is a unique mapping between some attribute of an alternative and its perceived value. In addition, the assignment of value is considered a property of the option and therefore value should not be influenced by the context in which alternatives are presented. For example, net energetic rate derivable from visiting a flower of a given size reward is a property of that flower alone and not context-dependent. Nonetheless, we know from many human experiments that perceptions are often influenced by context. For example, a circle of a given radius will appear larger when surrounded by small circles than when surrounded by very large circles (Fig. 4) .
There are many experiments that document specific contextual effects in decisionmaking that need exploration in animal choice behavior. In this short article I will only discuss two cases of context-dependent decision-making: evidence for intransitivity in choice behavior and the "asymmetric dominance effect." A more thorough treatment of context-dependent choice is presented by Tversky and Simonson (1993) . As I mentioned earlier, transitivity in choice behavior is considered a fundamental requirement of rational choice (Fishburn, 1991) . This requirement follows naturally if utility values are assigned independently to alternatives and then preferences are ordered according to these values. This method of preference formation generates an absolute scale of value assignment. However, in many cases, alternatives may involve multiple attributes which may each be evaluated independently. For example, flowers may be evaluated for their nectar reward size (benefit) as well as the depth of their corolla (cost). Ample evidence suggests that bees use both of these features of flowers in evaluating their overall value (Waddington, 1985) . These evaluations along each independent dimension may then be combined according to some relative or comparative scheme for value assignments (Tversky, 1969; Shafir, 1994) . For example, Tversky (1969) suggests an "additive difference rule" where for options X and Y the utilities along each of the n dimensions is calculated and then the difference between utilities along each dimension is summed, i.e., options are chosen according to the criterion S[£/(*,) -U(Yft. If the summed difference is positive, then option X is preferred. If the sum is negative then Y is preferred. The use of comparative evaluations along each dimension i opens choice up to the possibility of intransitivity in preferences.
In an eloquent series of experiments, Sharoni Shafir (1994) documented the existence of intransitive preferences in flower selection by honey bees, lending support to a comparative rather than an absolute rule for value assignments. Individual honey bees were trained to forage on four different artificial floral types that differed in corolla length and nectar reward size: A flowers were 40 mm deep with 2 u.1 of sugar water, B flowers were 60 mm with 3 (xl, C flowers were 80 mm with 4 JJLI, and D flowers were 100 mm with 5 u.1 of sugar water. In general, individual bees preferred A to B {i.e., A > B), B > C, C > D, and A > D. However, in three of the fifteen bees tested, there was a significant pattern of intransitivity. In all three cases, A > B, B > C, C > D, but D > A. Such a pattern of intransitivity is not consistent with absolute value assignment but all of the bees behaviors are consistent with a comparative method of value assignment. The value of these results is not to suggest that most bees show intransitivity-they obviously do not-but to indicate the need for theories that include all patterns of behavior. Most bees show transitive choice. However, 20 per cent do not. Any theory of choice must be able to account for this 20 per cent, and therefore, we need to reconstuct choice theory to include context-dependencies and the possibility of intransitive patterns of choice.
It is clear that intransitivity can only result if there are multiple dimensions (attributes) under consideration in each option in the decision. Single attributes can only be compared along a single dimension and therefore there is a unique ordering. It seems natural that a corollary to this possibility is that as the number of attributes under consideration increases, the possibility for intransitivity in preference formation increases. This is a conjecture that could be easily tested by constructing choices with an increasing number of attributes associated with each option. To my knowledge no such test has been undertaken.
When there are multiple attributes under consideration, then several other paradoxical behaviors can arise. One of the most notable is the "asymmetric dominance effect" (Sharoni Shafir, pers. comm., Tversky and Simonson 1993) which illustrates the complications arising from changes in the number of options that may be under consideration. Suppose a young graduating Ph.D. in biology is offered two jobs. The first is from The University of X offering $45,000/year in salary. The second offer is from The University of Y at $30,000/year. This choice is difficult because the two universities differ in the overall prestige of the institution and in the qualities of their respective biology departments. Assume Y is "better" than X which is why X feels it should offer more money. Let us assume the job candidate ranks academic excellence higher than money, and picks The University of Y. There is nothing irrational here, just a reflection that prestige carries enormous weight in academic circles. However, imagine that there was a third offer simultaneous with the other two from the University of Z at $30,000/year. Unfortunately for the University of Z it has neither prestige (X and Y are far superior) nor does it offer a competing wage (X and Y are equal or better). So really, the offer from Z should be irrelevant to any choices between X and Y. But what happens?
A large body of evidence suggests that human subjects will increase their preference for Y (Tversky and Simonson, 1993) . Individual decision agents will feel more strongly that they have made the right decision and more agents as a class will choose Y over X. Now this is clearly irrational if preferences are formed solely on an absolute utility scale. In this example, however, increasing the number of options and increasing the range of experienced attributes has shifted value assignment.
The implications of this simple example for natural systems is really quite profound. Foragers (or organisms engaged in other decision tasks) may structure their choices very differently depending upon the number of options available and the range of attributes under consideration. If the number and range change, then the entire valuation scheme may change in a manner that would appear quite irrational.
Clearly context, background, and complexity in the number of attributes under consideration matters in the decision-making process and we need to determine the degree to which behavior patterns change when we add more of the complexity anticipated within the organism's natural environment.
THE ELLSBURG PARADOX AND THE PREFERENCE FOR INFORMATION
In this last section I want to mention one more paradox that has been extremely in-fluential in economic decision theory-the Ellsburg Paradox. I include this paradox here for completeness since the testing of this paradox in animal systems will be very difficult. The paradox is quite simply stated. Imagine that you must make a choice between two urns A and B. In urn A there are 50 white balls and 50 black balls. Urn B contains 100 balls, but the ratio of white to black is not known. You will receive $100 if you pick out a white ball from one of the urns. Which urn do you choose to draw from? Most people pick urn A. Now we repeat the game with the same urns only this time it is not white that pays but black. From these same urns you get $100 if you pick out a black ball. Which urn do you choose? Most people stay with urn A! and this is quite irrational. Why? Implicitly, the choice of urn A in the first round when white paid means that you must have felt that the likelihood of drawing white from A was higher than the likelihood of drawing white from B. Since urn A has 50/50, then there must be more than 50 black balls in urn B. So when the payoff switches to black, the only rational choice (given a prior preference for urn A) is to switch and choose urn B in the second round. But most people do not switch. Actually it does not matter rationally which urn you choose and truly rational behavior corresponds to indifference between urns A and B. But people show a very strong preference for the urn with information. We know that urn A has 50/50 and somehow that information confers value. The information in this particular choice experiment has no real value, but perhaps we are entrained (either through learning or through evolution) that information in and of itself is valuable.
It will be interesting to see if animals commit the Ellsburg Paradox. It will be especially interesting to see how one designs an experiment to test for the Ellsburg paradox. In the human example, we can represent an unspecified ratio of white to black balls among the 100 in urn B. Human subjects know what we are talking about. But how do we relate information about events or occurrences to organisms without letting them experience the environment? How do we tell a bee that there are 100 flowers in patch A, p of which are white and 1 -p of which are blue, without letting the bee experience patch A? This will be a difficult experiment to design since so much of the structure of the paradox relies on symbolic representations of numerical relationships rather than directly experienced events. Perhaps it is at this point, where decisions involve strictly symbolic representations, that the similarities between human cognitive information-processing and non-human information-processing begins to breakdown.
CONCLUSION
Theories and accounts of decision-making in behavioral ecology have tended to focus on the currency of choice and the rules associated with the assignment of value to alternatives. This focus seems only natural since the main interest of behavioral ecology has been functional evolutionary accounts of behavior. We are beginning to see how these currencies may be experimentally evaluated and even how some aspects of value assignment may be implemented in specific neural substrates. Currency and value assignment, however, are only one aspect of the decision-making process. The perception of probabilities, the perception of spatial and temporal pattern of occurrence, the perception of magnitudes of reward and reinforcement, and the manner by which all of these perceptions are influenced by context and complexity are co-equal determinants of decision-making. The second phase of research on risk sensitivity will undoubtedly have to focus on these perceptual and cognitive foundations. The use of apparent paradox will prove invaluable in uncovering these basic perceptual and cognitive mechanisms.
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